My book project, Managing Financial Crises: The Political Economy of Demand for Global Financial Insurance, explains when and why states and governments in financial duress choose to use different financing strategies to manage their crises, including precautionary and non-precautionary IMF loans and currency swap lines. These strategies shed light on the domestic and international politics of financial crises and the evolving structure of global financial governance. My book project employs a range of empirical methods, including time-series, cross-sectional analysis, elite survey experiments, elite interviews, and qualitative case studies.
"Political Moral Hazard and Market Signaling: The Political Economy of Swap Line and IMF Loan Use" [JMP]
"International Investors and the Modern Global Financial Safety Net"
“Monetary and Fiscal Fetters: Macroeconomic Constraints and the Politics of Countercyclical Credit Management"
with Mark Copelovitch